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Maybe we can use clever crypto-
graphic techniques to prevent that; 
however, the whole scheme is use-
less if there’s no way to uncover 
the real person behind the packets. 
What policy should control that? 
If the government of Freedonia 
wants to unmask my identity, is it 
to trace a real cyberattack, harass 
or block me for my political beliefs, 
or simply to sell the information to 
a Freedonian multinational? And 
if we can’t solve that, how can we 
expect to trace back attacks coming 
from Freedonia?
P erhaps there’s a good answer to that one, too. Maybe some 
miraculous cryptographic solution 
does exist, with anonymous cre-
dentials and proxy signatures and 
honest international cooperation—
but it still won’t work. Most online 
misbehavior comes from hacked 
machines; in turns, these machines 
have been hacked because of buggy 
code. Strong authentication is useful 
in many circumstances, but the bad 
guys don’t have to go through the 
authentication system—they simply 
go around it. A strongly encrypted, 
strongly authenticated connection 
between a hacked machine and an-
other target still lets the bad guys in, 
whereas identification does noth-
ing but mislead the good guys. In 
other words, identification will be 
useful only when we don’t need it 
because we’ve solved the computer 
security problem. 
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we did, we can’t have strong, use-
ful identification. Second, having 
such identification would cause bad 
side-effects. Third, and most im-
portant, it couldn’t solve the prob-
lems. Although we don’t know 
what a solution might look like, 
we know where it has to fit—and 
it isn’t in the box labeled “identity.”
A strong identification system 
presupposes a strong notion of 
identity. The Internet, though, is 
multilayered; identity is different 
at each layer. My computer has 
three different MAC addresses 
and several IP addresses, including 
many IP addresses and logins for 
different instant message systems. 
If I switch computers, locations, or 
employers, several of these would 
change. Am I no longer myself? 
Sophistry, some would say; those 
could all be temporarily bound to 
my “real” identity. In that case, we 
already have pretty strong identifi-
cation, in the combination of time 
stamp, IP address, and log files.
Suppose, though, that we really 
do want strong identification; we’re 
even going to digitally sign every 
packet. Someone, of course, has to 
issue the credentials. Who should 
it be? Would the US government 
trust credentials issued by China? 
Would the Chinese government 
trust American credentials? The 
answers to the last two questions, 
of course, are a resounding “no.”
Even if we could move past 
the credentialing problem, how 
do we handle what I call “proxy 
packets”? If I send you mail, it 
goes from my laptop to an or-
ganizational mail handler that 
serves thousands of users. It sends 
my mail to your organization’s 
inbound mail handler; in turn, 
your computer picks up the email. 
But that middle hop, from mail 
handler to mail handler, can’t be 
signed by my key; how can the 
mail—perhaps virus-infected—be 
attributed to me at that level? The 
answer is the logs on the sending 
system, but if we have those logs, 
we don’t need signed packets.
Assume, however, that we can 
make all that work. We have now 
created serious privacy problems. 
I’m certainly willing to let the gov-
ernment trace my packets in pursuit 
of an actual, identified criminal. I 
might be willing to have it make 
records preemptively, in the hope 
of deterring or catching future at-
tackers. But I’m certainly not will-
ing to let the megacorporations 
of the world track my every step 
through cyberspace. Web cook-
ies and local stored objects are bad 
enough; I don’t need another form 
of identification that I can’t turn off. 
P
eople raise the issue every few years: “If only,” 
they say, “the Internet had strong identifica-
tion, we wouldn’t have so many security 
problems. Perhaps we can reinvent the In-
ternet to correct that mistake.” It won’t work. First, even if
Steven M. 
Bellovin
Columbia 
University
Identity	and	Security
